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Abstract
Horizontal agreements between competitors concerning price fixing, quotas, 
distribution and/or supply market share – cartels – represent the most severe form 
of competition law infringement. Why are these agreements subject to the highest 
fines and, in some countries (USA, Canada, Mexico, UK), subject to both fines as 
well as imprisonment? What are the economic grounds for such severe punishment? 
How important is an economic analysis for the results of anti-cartel proceedings 
considering that they are prohibited per se, that is, absolutely and unconditionally? 
Does growing market concentration and resulting transparency increase the 
significance of the economic approach to the evaluation of market effects of the 
behaviour of business? Which methods make it possible to differentiate cartels from 
competition in oligopolistic markets including economic and econometric analyses? 
This paper will present an answer to the aforementioned questions on the basis of 
literature studies, an analysis of Polish case law between 2000–2009 as well as the 
author’s extensive experience in the field of antitrust consultancy.
* Prof. Dr. Anna Fornalczyk, Professor on Microeconomics and Economics of Competition 
Policy at the Technical University of Łódź, Department of Organisation and Management. 
President of the Antimonopoly Office in Poland between 1990 and 1995.
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I. Economic dimension of cartels
The Polish Competition and Consumers Protection Act of 20071 (thereafter 
the Act of 2007) protects competition as a public interest similarly to the 
situation found in other EU countries. Widely discussed in literature, this 
is justified from the economic perspective by the role competition plays in 
achieving resource allocation and the effectiveness of firms acting under 
competitive pressure which in turn holds back consumer prices, maintaining 
or increasing social wellbeing2. Some believe, that competition not only 
facilitates effectiveness and stops price increases but also serves other 
goals such as the EU’s aim of “[m]arket integration, openness, control of 
dominance, fairness, and competitiveness, the growth of efficient, dynamic 
and responsive firms for the sake of European economic strength in world 
markets”3.
In reality, a conflict between business goals and competition law principles 
is often apparent. Competition law finds justification in microeconomic 
theory, and not only in the concept of social deadweight loss4, but also in 
the concept explaining the essence, reasons and ways to minimize market 
failures5. 
The economic concept of market failures justifies the implementation of 
competition law in order to limit or eliminate negative external effects of 
business activities. These effects are associated with the exercise of monopolistic 
practices. Entrepreneurs base their businesses on a cost-benefit analysis, which 
may suggest the profitability of practices consisting of an abuse of dominance 
and/or of the conclusion of an agreement stabilising their own market position 
by restricting competition. Polish entrepreneurs are quite frequently unaware 
1 Journal of Laws 2007 No 50, item 331, with subsequent amendments.
2 H.R. Varian, Mikroekonomia, Warszawa 1997, p. 560–573; L.M.B. Cabral, Introduction to 
Industrial Organization, Cambridge 2000, p. 252–254.
3 E. Fox, The Competition Law of the European Union In Comparative Perspective, St. Paul, 
MN, West Publishing Co. 2009, p. 31.
4 E. Czarny, E. Nojszewska, Mikroekonomia, Warszawa 2000, p. 152–153.
5 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York 
1983, p. 5–6; W.J. Baumol, A.S. Blinder, Economics Principles and Policy, San Diego 1988, p. 648; 
J.E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, New York 1988, p. 71–81; E. Czarny, E. Nojszewska, 
Mikroekonomia, p. 348–373.
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of the fact that economically acceptable and rational business actions may in 
fact infringe competition law6. 
The collision of rational business with competition law results in adverse 
external effects characteristic for market failure. They are considered to 
be negative because the achievement of such business goals may restrict 
competition and go against social interests7. The external character of such 
effects can be traced back to the fact that the losses incurred by other market 
players (competitors, consumers) are not included in the cost-benefit analysis 
carried out by the entrepreneur pursuing a monopolistic practice. In fact, 
the exercise of such practices constitutes a “zero-one” game seeing as entity 
(entities) involved in monopolistic practices benefits from them at the expense 
of other market players. 
It is hard to imagine that entrepreneurs would assess external losses 
associated with their practices and include them in their own cost-benefit 
analysis as applied, for instance, in the case of environmental charges. Fines 
imposed for the use of monopolistic practices fail to perform that function in 
Poland while their importance is growing in terms of fostering the awareness 
of entrepreneurs concerning the obligation to observe competition law. 
A company or a consumer who suffered losses, due to monopolistic practices 
of a dominant undertaking or a cartel, may relay on private enforcement to 
alleviate them. However, while private enforcement is popular in the US and 
gaining importance in Europe, the lengthiness of court suits remains a strongly 
deterrent for private enforcement in Poland.
Restricting market power resulting from a dominant position or cartel 
requires state intervention. In case of Polish competition law, this translates 
into the opening of explanatory and/or antitrust proceedings by the President 
of the Office of Competition and Consumers Protection (hereafter, President 
of UOKiK). Mentioned here should be however the administrative weaknesses 
formulated by J. Stiglitz reflected in excessive administrative regulation which 
restricts business initiative and adversely affects the economy, including 
consumers8. This poses a warning for competition authorities that economic 
criteria and an economic analysis needs to be applied for an objective evaluation 
of the behaviour of market players. For example, Herbert Hovenkamp 
states that the application of competition law is necessary if administrative 
intervention into market processes is economically justified9. 
6 Znajomość prawa o ochronie konkurencji i zasadach przydzielania pomocy publicznej wśród 
polskich przedsiębiorców, UOKiK, Warszawa 2009, p. 14, 59–60.
7 R. Whish, Competition Law, London, Edinburgh 1993, p. 127.
8 J.E. Stiglitz, Economics..., p. 5–6.
9 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise. Principle and Execution, Harvard 2005, p. 10.
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Particularly in the US, the issues of an economic justification for the 
application of competition law has been a topic of dispute for decades between 
liberals and the representatives of a structural approach to market behaviour 
of companies. The liberal economists of the Chicago and post-Chicago 
School believe that, except for the monitoring of large concentrations and 
cartels, administrative intervention in anti-competitive business behaviour is 
unnecessary. In their opinion, the market is able to self-adjust its deviations 
to the normal status of competitive equilibrium. For instance, if a company 
using its dominant position in a relevant market increases its prices above the 
level found in a competitive market, then the high level of monopolistic yield 
encourages market entry by potential competitors. The post-Chicago School 
furthers the market behaviour concept using game theory, more sophisticated 
analyses based on market information asymmetry, the economy of scale and 
the concept of rising rival’s costs10.
Microeconomics explains it as generating economic profit when inter-
sectorial differentiations cause capital flows from less to more effective 
applications until the economic profit reaches zero level, where the economy is 
in competitive equilibrium11. This process is limited by entry and exit barriers12. 
The higher the barriers, the more difficult it is for a potential competitor to 
enter a market characterised by high economic profits – businesses operating 
in that market maintain their market power and benefit from monopolistic 
profits. This fact is frequently the reason for companies to create and maintain 
barriers of administrative, structural or strategic nature. 
Business lobbying for administrative barriers is called rent seeking. Structural 
barriers result from technological processes and translate into economic terms 
of demand for material, personal and financial resources the size of which 
differs in various sectors (thus they are called objective barriers). Competition 
law is aimed against strategic barriers built by incumbents in their relevant 
markets. An agreement between competitors operating in a particular market 
may effectively close that market for potential competition, enabling parties to 
that agreement to apply monopolistic practices and achieve profits thereof.
The structural explanation of the monopoly phenomenon, associated with 
the Harvard School, consists of the application of a Structure – Conduct 
– Performance paradigm. This paradigm, also known to organisation and 
management theory, leads to the conclusion that companies operate within 
the limits set by market structure13. Competition authorities are thus required 
10 Ibidem, p. 31–91.
11 K. N. Hylton, Antitrust Law. Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge 
2003, p. 9.
12 J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, USA 1993.
13 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise…, p. 33–35.
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to preventively monitor concentrations so as to prevent the creation of 
business structures facilitating monopolistic practices seeing as it is better 
to prevent the occurrence of market conditions generating such practices 
than to counteract the practices themselves. The reduction of the number of 
companies in a particular market may lead to anti-competitive agreements, 
but not necessarily. It is long since it was noted that, in a transparent market, 
conscious parallelism may appear as a consequence of independent decisions 
of businesses operating in that market concerning their prices and production 
volumes14. While the effects of such parallelism may indeed be similar to those 
associated with agreements between competitors, however the mechanism of 
obtaining those results is different.
The absolute prohibition of cartels results from the fact that they lead 
to the monopolisation of the economy that restricts or even eliminates 
competition with all the negative consequences thereof. It is also important 
that the organisation of a cartel is more time and cost efficient than building 
a dominant position by a company in its own relevant market15. This justifies 
the implementation of particularly severe restrictions against agreements 
between competitors aimed at price fixing, setting production and sales quotas, 
sharing markets, setting other terms of trade or the exchange of sensitive 
information16. 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Act of 2007 contains a prohibition of agreements 
“[w]hich have as their object or effect the elimination, restriction or any other 
infringement of competition on the relevant market shall be prohibited, in 
particular those consisting in:
1) fixing, directly or indirectly, prices and other conditions of purchase or 
sales of products,
2) limiting or controlling production or supply as well as technical develop-
ment or investments,
3) sharing markets of supply or purchase,
 (…)
7) collusion  between  entrepreneurs  entering  a  tender,  or  by  those 
entrepreneurs and the entrepreneur being the tender organiser, of the 
terms and conditions of bids to be proposed, particularly as regards the 
scope of works and the price”. 
14 J.A. Rahl, “Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws” (1950) 44 Illinois Law Review 743.
15 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise…, p. 125.
16 R. Whish, Competition Law, p. 127; R.A. Posner, F.H. Easterbrook, Antitrust Cases. 
Economic Notes and Other Materials, West Publishing 1981, p. 96–98; M. Motta, Competition 
Policy. Theory and Practice, Cambridge 2005, p. 137; A. Fornalczyk, Biznes a ochrona konkurencji, 
Kraków 2007, p. 85–86; Zmowy cenowe, UOKiK, Warszawa 2009, p. 11; M. Bernatt, 
A. Jurkowska, T. Skoczny, Ochrona konkurencji i konsumentów, Warszawa 2007, p. 59.
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The aforementioned examples of anti-competitive agreements are not 
covered by the three legislative exemptions: a) the de minimis exemption, 
b) the rule of reason, and c) block exemptions. 
Of direct relevance to cartel proceedings is the fact that the Act of 2007 treats 
the intention to restrict or eliminate competition in a relevant market (purpose 
of an agreement) as an action infringing competition law, irrespective of its 
implementation (effect of an agreement). Establishing such an aim requires 
an examination whether it appeared in written and/or oral agreements or in 
documents containing reports of the meetings of the representatives of an 
alleged cartel. Herbert Hovenkamp called this approach as “fundamentally 
subjective”. It is characteristic to the legal approach associated with cartels. 
Economists do not see cartels through the prism of written or oral agreements 
but evaluate them from the point of view of the market structure and the 
strategy executed by their alleged members. Hovenkamp called the economic 
approach to cartels as “fundamentally objective”17. 
II.  Counteracting cartels in the decisions of the President 
of the Office of Competition and Consumers Protection
The majority of the decisions of the Polish UOKiK, known as the 
Antimonopoly Office between 1990-1995, concerns the preventive monitoring 
of concentrations and a small percentage relates to cartels (anti-competitive 
horizontal agreements). Nevertheless, the focus has now clearly shifted towards 
cartels especially since the Act of 2007 has eliminated motions (Articles 49 
and 86) in favour of an ex officio initiation of competition law proceedings. 
The decisions of the President of UOKiK against cartels can be classified 
into three categories:
a) counteracting price fixing and setting other terms of business activities 
by entrepreneurs associated in professional associations (Union of 
Polish Architects, Regional Pharmaceutical Chambers in Łódź and 
Poznań, Warsaw Veterinary Chamber, Polish Chamber of Electronic 
Communication),
b) agreements between entrepreneurs (sugar plants, producers of chemical 
fertilizers, taxi corporations, municipal utilities, funeral services, outdoor 
advertising agencies, yeast producers, local market management 
companies, press distribution agencies, real estate agencies),
c) tender agreements (furniture manufacturers, municipal waste manage-
ment companies, companies renting mooring infrastructure, public trans-
port companies). 
17 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise…, p. 126, 135.
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Currently underway are proceedings against an alleged cartel of cement 
producers and against an alleged cartel of waste management companies from 
Białystok, which is charged with setting binding terms in a tender announced 
by local authorities.
The UOKiK finds information necessary to establish a restriction of 
competition associated with fixing minimum fees for services provided 
by members of professional associations in draft statutes or already adopted 
by-laws of such associations as they contain provisions contradictory to 
Article 6(1)(1) of the Act of 2007. In the case of tender collusions, the 
information sources can be traced back to motions and/or notifications 
filed by the organisers of the tenders or by bidders not participating in the 
collusion. 
The UOKiK acquires information concerning price fixing agreements, 
production quotas and/or market sharing from various sources: market 
research carried out by its office staff, information received from consumers 
and entrepreneurs who either supply or purchase goods allegedly regulated 
by a cartel and the leniency programme which is proving to be an effective 
new source of information for the authorities. New and effective source of 
information is the leniency policy, which was introduced in the European Union 
in 1996, and has been in force in Poland since 2004. Since then 16 leniency 
notices have been filed with the Office. The programme was enacted in Poland 
in February 2007 (Law: Article 109) and further developed by a Regulation 
of the Council of Ministers of January 2009. In 2009 the President of UOKiK 
published additional guidelines explaining the goals and application procedure 
of the programme.  
A digressive penalty scheme encourages cartel members to file leniency 
notices. An entrepreneur will not be punished with a statutory penalty for 
participating in a cartel as long as it is not its initiator, as long as it is the first 
to provides the President of UOKiK with information on the cartel which 
is sufficient to initiate proceedings, and as long as the company quits the 
cartel upon filing the leniency notice. The second applicant, satisfying the 
aforementioned criteria, may have its penalty reduced by no more than 50%. 
The third may receive a 30% reduction while further applications might have 
their fines reduced by up to 20%. 
The effectiveness of anti-cartel proceedings is reinforced by the statutory 
competences of the President of UOKiK to control and dawn raid the premises 
and/or goods associated with a cartel. That competence is subject to consent 
by the Polish Court for Competition and Consumers Protection granted, 
within 48 hours, upon the request of the President of UOKiK– the Court’s 
decision in this respect cannot be appealed (Article 64). An actual dawn raid 
took place in May 2006 in the premises of eight cement producers “Polski 
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Cement” Association of Cement Producers and a legal bureau working for 
the Association18. 
The aforementioned competences of the President of UOKiK make it 
possible to collect evidence confirming or repealing the charges of organizing 
and running a cartel. However, they do not exclude the application of a 
thorough analysis characteristic for the “fundamentally objective” approach 
to the market conduct of entrepreneurs charged with cartel offences.
III. Role of economic analysis in anti-cartel proceedings
The evaluation of market consequences of alleged cartels is performed in 
two stages in the economics of competition law. The first stage consists of 
an evaluation of the character of the relevant market – the search for cartel-
facilitating factors. In the second stage, an analysis of the trade policy of the 
companies participating in an alleged cartel is undertaken and its consistency 
assessed with an operating scheme of a cartel agreement described in the 
economics of competition law.
The economics of competition law mentions the following factors facilitating 
cartel collusions19:
a) level of market concentration – the higher is market concentration, the 
easier it is to organise a cartel,
b) high barriers to entry and exit the relevant market – the higher the 
barriers, the stronger the motives to enter into a cartel, the more durable 
the cartel and the longer the period of generating monopolistic profits,
c) insignificant market shares of small companies not participating in the 
cartel – they may not threaten the existence of the cartel by snatching 
customers from cartel members through underpricing and offering better 
terms of contract (e.g. payment terms),
d) price elasticity of demand – the higher the elasticity, the more difficult 
it is to fix high prices which generate expected yields for cartel mem-
bers,
e) expected demand changes – for a member of a cartel, it is not worth going 
against a cartel agreement in order to increase its immediate profits when 
significant demand growth is foreseen for the cartel (growing market); 
this leads to a conclusion that on a mature market without prospects 
18 Zmowy cenowe, p. 27.
19 H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise…, p. 132–133, M. Motta, Competition Policy, 
p. 142–159; R.A. Posner, F.H. Easterbrock, Antitrust Cases…, p. 336–346.
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for significant demand growth, the motives for cartelization are weaker 
while the tendency to breach the price agreement is stronger,
f) product uniformity and standardisation – the more uniform and 
standardised the product, the stronger the tendency among entrepreneurs 
to enter into a cartel,
g) regularity and frequency of orders – the higher and the rarer the orders, 
the weaker the tendency to form a cartel and, should the cartel already 
exists, the stronger the tendency to breach cartel agreements,
h) market power of the consumers – the greater the negotiating power of 
the consumers,  the weaker the tendency to conclude cartel agreement 
by the sellers and, should the cartel already exist, the easier it is to 
destabilize it by individual negotiations concerning prices and other 
contractual terms,
i) ratio of fixed costs in company operating costs – the higher the ratio, the 
stronger the tendency to form a cartel in order to reduce market risk,
j) market structure symmetry – the more symmetrical the market (with 
a limited number of market players), the stronger the tendency to form 
a cartel,
k) resale price fixing – the application of vertical restrictions facilitates 
the formation of a cartel as it increases the potential control over the 
distributors’ price discipline,
l) ownership relations between companies – agreements concluded within 
a capital group are not subject to competition law unless such agreements 
adversely and severely affect competition in a relevant market20.
Establishing the existence of cartel facilitating factors is considered to be the 
purpose of the relevant market analysis which requires the economic approach 
to determine: actual and potential competition (market barriers), price elasticity 
of demand, market development level, cost structure of the members of the 
alleged cartel and their market power as well as the market power of their 
customers. Probability of cartel formation is low on unfavourable markets 
however its analysis requires statistical data and information concerning 
the market under examination. This frequently proves a major barrier for 
the application of an economic analysis. Particularly in the Polish economy, 
market dynamics causes the relevant data to be impossible to compare in the 
longer term because it is not long since most companies introduced electronic 
accounting and statistics systems that could provide such data (in general, this 
is a period after the year 2000).
20 S. Gronowski, Ustawa antymonopolowa – komentarz, Warszawa 1999, p. 78.
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IV. Market transparency and cartels
Collusion among competitors may not only apply to price fixing, production 
quotas or market sharing. It may also affect, for example, exiting one relevant 
market with a guarantee of exclusivity on another, co-ordination of payment 
terms in transactions with consumers and/or suppliers or agreeing transport 
conditions for sold products (own or customer’s transport). Independently 
from the issue of the ‘object’ of a collusive agreement, the application of 
competition law requires an examination whether a particular market conduct 
results from overt or tacit collusion. In the latter case, competition law shall 
not be applicable because, even though its market effects may seem similar 
to those of an overt collusion, entrepreneurs have neither met nor agreed 
upon their actions21. It is doubtful whether a convergence of market actions 
of competitors may at all be defined as collusion, even a tacit one.
Oligopolistic market structures, widely discussed in economic theory, are 
used in the economics of competition law22. Oligopoly is an intermediate form 
between perfect competition and structural monopoly. The main characteristics 
of oligopoly include:
a) limited number of producers and a large number of consumers,
b) barriers to entry, in particular, technological and/or economic ones but 
also administrative or strategic,
c) products offered in the market are usually close substitutes, even though 
they may be both homogeneous and heterogeneous,
d) producers and consumers have perfect information concerning the 
market – market is transparent.
A limited number of producers operating on an oligopolistic market 
translates into a relative ease of obtaining information about the relevant 
competitors. This is essential for increasing market transparency which may 
be facilitated by the following factors:
a) symmetry level – the closer market shares of the competitors, the more 
symmetric the oligopoly and the more transparent the market,
b) market concentration level – the more concentrated the oligopoly, the 
more transparent the market; market concentration is measured by 
market shares using the concentration rate or the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
21 M. Motta, Competition Policy, p. 137–138.
22 H.R. Varian, Mikroekonomia, p. 471; P.A. Samuelson, W.D. Nordhaus, Ekonomia, vol. 1, 
Warszawa 1998, p. 769; J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press 1988, 
p. 209; E. Czarny, E. Nojszewska, Mikroekonomia, p. 168–216; H. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust 
Enterprise…, p. 126-131; K. N.  Hylton, Antitrust Law..., p. 21–23, 73–81; M. Motta, Competition 
Policy, p. 138.
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Index – depending upon the number of competitors in the relevant 
market and the symmetry level of the oligopoly.
Conduct of competitors in an oligopoly is explained by the interdependence 
theory formulated by Augustin Cournot. In his model of product quantity 
equilibrium, Cournot described the interdependence between strategies of 
competitors in a particular form of oligopoly – a duopoly. His model was 
further developed by Heinrich von Stackelberg who presumed that one of the 
members of the duopoly knew that its competitor was following the principles 
of the Cournot model. Such a presumption leads to the “price-leader and 
price-follower” pattern23. 
Another model for analysing the equilibrium in a duopoly was formulated by 
Joseph Bertrand who examined the price interdependence of market behaviour 
of companies. From the perspective information collection in a transparent 
market, the Bertrand model seems to be more useful because it is easier to 
watch the prices of a company’s competitors rather than the volume of their 
sales. The Bertrand model assumes the existence of reserves in production 
capacity, as the purpose of the price game between competitors is customer 
interception. Additional demand for cheaper goods may only be satisfied subject 
to production increase. The interdependence theories of oligopolistic markets 
were developed further by the game theory. A conclusion is drawn from the 
interdependence theory that conscious parallelism of decisions on prices and 
production quotas should not be treated as collusion and, consequently, as an 
illegal action subject to competition law enforcement24. 
Interdependence (generating market followers) is reached through market 
research and strategic planning, or even by playing a sophisticated business 
game in order to mislead other market players. Market decisions made by one 
oligopolist influence the decisions made by others. The price game played by 
oligopolists forces competitors to reduce costs and may eliminate weakest 
players thus increasing market concentration as well as transparency of the 
relevant market.
In case of an oligopoly offering homogeneous products (such as cement, 
steel or flour), the product brand is not the key determinant for customers 
– instead they consider the price to be the primary selection criterion on 
such markets facilitating price competition between existing market players. 
Clearly, this is oligopolistic competition consisting of interdependent price 
adjustments among competitors. 
The realisation that the economics of competition law recognises the 
interdependence theory as an objective mechanism of oligopolistic markets 
does not change the fact that concentrated market structures facilitate the 
23 E. Czarny, E. Nojszewska, Mikroekonomia, p. 196–205.
24 K. N. Hylton, Antitrust Law…, p. 80–81.
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formation of cartels. It is essential therefore for competition authorities to 
assess whether the similarity of prices and/or other contractual terms derives 
from an agreement between competitors or from interdependence of their 
market actions in a transparent market. 
Cartels may be organised in different ways. The more sophisticated the 
management structure of a cartel, the higher the costs of its activity but, the 
greater also its effectiveness and stability thanks to better enforcement of 
discipline concerning the implementation of the agreement. The European 
cement cartel, which operated for ten years with the support of the European 
Association of Cement Producers (Cembureau), eight national associations and 
33 cement manufacturers, constitutes a good example of a precise organisation 
and stability of a cartel. The grounds of all UOKiK’s cartel decisions did not 
indicate that Polish cartels were organised in an equally precise way. It is likely 
that the weak discipline of Polish cartels results from a general lack of social 
capital (the inability to co-operate among Poles in various areas including, 
most probably, also cartel agreements.
My experience as an antitrust consultant to large companies in Poland 
explicitly indicates however that the more transparent the market, the higher 
the chance that meetings between competitors (even those of which minutes 
are kept) are not collusive. Instead, they often constitute a form of market 
research directed at shaping the individual actions of participating companies, 
which may be interdependent from the plans of their competitors. Similarly, a 
contribution to the financing of a sectorial association engaged in information 
exchange, or facilitating such exchange during the meetings of its members, is 
treated as costs of information collection. In practice, it is often less expensive 
to support such an association than conducting individual market research or 
purchasing data from specialised research companies. 
Polish experiences show also that the competition authority should treat leniency 
notices with extreme prudence because it is possible that the applicant is more 
intent on harming its competitors than on benefiting from a penalty reduction. This 
of course does not discredit the leniency procedure as such (effectively applied in 
the USA since 1978), but it is worth pointing out the risk of its misuse.
V. Criteria and consequences of effectiveness of cartel 
An analysis of past cartel agreements allowed the economics of competition 
law to identify six presumptions for a “good” operation of a cartel25:
25 H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy. The Law of Competition and its Practice, St. Paul, 
MN 1994, p. 141.
Vol. 2009, 2(2)
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO COUNTERACTING CARTELS 45
a) relevant market must have high barriers to entry and exit – the higher the 
barriers, the stronger the tendency among cartel participants to maintain 
discipline because there is no threat that newcomers will destabilize the 
market on which the cartel operates; when barriers to entry and exit are 
low (contestable market), a cartel might not be threatened either, if the 
new entrants join the agreement,
b) cartel members must have market shares which will guarantee them safe 
operations – market shares of companies not participating in the cartel 
must be sufficiently small for their sale increase to not affect the cartel 
agreement,
c) contrary to the common view, the key issue in cartel agreements are 
not prices (which may be monitored on a transparent market using 
information provided by the buyers during price negotiations) but 
production quotas that guarantee the stability of the market share of 
cartel members; significant variations existing in marginal costs may pose 
a serious difficulty when distributing production quotas among cartel 
members,
d) internal cartel management system must ensure the detection of all 
breaches of the agreement; the possibility of discretional infringements 
weakens its power and may transform it into an apparent cartel,
e) infringements of the cartel agreement must be penalised – if breaches 
go unpunished, the cartel’s discipline weakens which may transform it 
into an apparent cartel,
f) there must be a safeguard against disclosing the existence of the cartel 
– the social harm of explicit collusion causes their absolute prohibition 
and activates competition law in order to counteract this form of market 
monopolisation.
The flow of market information is believed to be a key factor in economic 
concepts concerning oligopoly, market transparency and/or competition 
restricting agreements. This may be an exchange of trade, investment, 
innovation and financial information classified as private – directed only 
to competitors26. It constitutes a manifestation of explicit collusion, even 
though some believe that such an exchange of information helps to better 
satisfy consumer needs and accelerates innovations. The explanation of this 
phenomenon may be found in the concept of co-opetition, according to which 
entrepreneurs are willing and should co-operate in the process of added value 
creation, while they should compete in the process of added value distribution 
in the relevant market27. 
26 M. Motta, Competition Policy…, p. 153.
27 A.M. Branderburger, B.J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition, New York 1998, p. 4.
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Public information exchange consists of the distribution of information to 
all market players (competitors, buyers and consumers). Although this type 
of information flow can facilitate price-fixing agreements, it simultaneously 
improves market transparency for consumers. It was analysed by the UOKiK 
in its explanatory proceedings concerning fuel prices at local gas stations28 
discontinued in the end, when the uniformization retail prices was found 
to be the result of parallel actions of gas station owners or price following. 
Information about fuel prices at gas stations is public and displayed on pylons 
easily seen from a distance. Parallel action is not prohibited by competition law 
and the President of UOKiK did not find collusion between the gas stations.
While the economics of competition law is focusing more and more on 
the market effects of cartel operations, a key question arises: how can an 
infringement of competition law be established if there is no hard evidence in 
the form of documents confirming the existence of a cartel, market analysis 
does not confirm price convergence, fixed market shares and market division? 
Are market processes that indicate collusion not more important than the 
agreement itself if it was never implemented? 
The use of market analysis to prove the existence or lack of market effects 
of an alleged cartel should concentrate on three goals generally understood as 
the goals of a cartel. First, price-fixing is effective when: cartel members have 
similar production costs, including the ratio of fixed to total costs; transactions 
are frequent and small and; the bidding power of buyers is low making them 
unable to threaten the cartel. If these criteria are not fulfilled, the cartel lacks 
discipline in the application of the fixed prices, which might reduce it to price 
lists only that are generally in the public domain. Actual prices result from 
negotiations among sellers and buyers. Very often buyers  use prices offered by 
one seller as an argument in a transactional game with other sellers . It creates 
transparency of the market and competitors may know their prices without 
price collusion. The evaluation of actual prices requires an analysis of prices in 
a particular period. Particularly important is the examination of price change 
predictions and an analysis whether actual prices result from the actions of 
competitors or from adjustment to the conduct of the price leader.
Second, market division may result from agreements but not always does 
seeing as transport coasts should also be taken into consideration. Competition 
law case law assumes that transport costs constitute a market barrier if their 
proportion in a single transaction exceeds 5%. Thus, depending on the physical 
and chemical properties of the goods, the producer may be selling its products 
in a particular territory not as a result of an agreement between competitors, 
but due to the optimization of trade logistics. Natural sellers’ markets might 
28 Zmowy cenowe, p. 23–24.
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exist in such cases, where the possibility of an entry onto another market can 
not be excluded, but would require profitability depends on transport costs.
Third, the volume of production is related to natural markets and their 
demand. If the analysis of pricing policy and of the optimization of distributional 
logistics indicates that it was impossible to establish the existence of a cartel 
regulating these areas, then the presumption on fixing production quotas 
would be illogical. Production quota fixing is a substitute for price-fixing, if 
the prices result from an attempt to maximize the profit of the seller and 
price negotiations with buyers, then production quotas must result from a 
cost-price analysis. 
Economic analyses, being fully aware of their statistical and methodological 
weaknesses, should be applied in anti-cartel proceedings in order to keep the 
equilibrium between a legalistic and an economic approach to the evaluation 
of business performance. The economic theory, used by the economics of 
competition law, has at its disposal many concepts and instruments for the 
evaluation of market effects of an identified collusion or for excluding the 
existence of such an agreement on a given relevant market. The need for an 
economization of antitrust proceedings, including anti-cartel ones, pointed 
out in the economics of competition law, should modify the current approach 
applied to cartels. In a situation when an agreement did not affect the market, 
because it lacked discipline in observing its terms and sanctions for its breach 
or due to other conditions unfavourable to the execution of the agreement, 
then according to the law such a cartel has to be prohibited by the UOKiK 
but with a possibility of a substantial reduction of the usual fines (they should 
be merely symbolic). 
VI. Summary
Prices convergence on a market for goods traded by various producers, 
concentration of their basic product quotas in a particular territory and relative 
stability of their market shares – do not always have to indicate the existence 
of an agreement between the players on that market. An economic analysis 
of their trade policies, of the optimization of distributional logistics and of 
the relationship between the volume of production and the demand level on a 
relevant market, may ultimately prove that their market conduct is shaped by 
the interdependence of business decisions made on a transparent market. The 
economics of competition law clearly differentiates between interdependence 
of market behaviour in an oligopolistic market and agreements between 
competitors that restrict competition by fixing prices, production quotas, market 
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sharing or building barriers to entry for potential newcomers. Competition law 
should be applied only in cases when the competition authority can prove the 
existence of an overt collusion but not in cases of tacit ones.
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